Davide Bove, M. Sc.
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Current mobile devices on Android and iOS make use of TEEs to execute specific actions. For example creating and managing a cryptographic key is done in the ARM TrustZone, a separate OS that is runs in parallel to the normal OS. Technically, a trusted application is running inside the TEE context and does all the necessary computation. The resulting private key never leaves the TEE, and even the operating system cannot directly access it.
For a security analysis, we want to implement a number of applications that make use of trusted apps to perform security-critical actions. For this, we make use of the free RISC-V  architecture. On top of it, we run Keystone [2,3], a framework for designing and building own TEEs.
The goal of this thesis is to build a test environment for TEEs that can be used to test specific TEE designs and architectures in an automated way.
For the RISC-V architecture, there are several academic or commercial Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) solutions that have different requirements.
These solutions are based on RISC-V features such as processor modes, physical memory protection (PMP) and more. Especially regarding the processor modes, most RISC-V TEE frameworks require M-S-U modes to function correctly. Apart from the proprietary Hex-Five MultiZone , there are no solutions for embedded low-power RISC-V platforms that only implement M or M-U modes.
In this work we explore the challenges and chances of existing TEE frameworks and propose a new framework that can be deployed on embedded devices.
- Designing Secure Enclaves on RISC-V
- Aufbereitung und Analyse von Honeypot-Daten
- Machine Learning based analysis of honeynet logs
- Creating an Online Training Platform for Penetration Testing
- On the Security and Privacy Implications of NFC-based Transactions
- Analysis Tools for RISC-V Apps
Topics I might supervise (if you ask nicely):
- Mobile security (Android, iOS)
- Security of Embedded devices
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- Lange Nacht der Wissenschaften 2019, Live Hacking Demonstration, Speaker alongside Dr.-Ing. Tilo Müller, Marcel Busch, Anatoli Kalysch and Tobias Groß.
- The 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (IEEE CSCloud 2019), Paris, France, Speaker.
- Bove, D., & Kalysch, A. (2019). In pursuit of a secure UI: The cycle of breaking and fixing Android’s UI. it - Information Technology, Methods and Applications of Informatics and Information Technology. https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/itit-2018-0023
- Bove, D., & Müller, T. (2019). Investigating Characteristics of Attacks on Public Cloud Systems. In 2019 6th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud) (pp. 89-94). Paris, FR.
- Kalysch, A., Bove, D., & Müller, T. (2018). How Android’s UI Security is Undermined by Accessibility. In Proceedings of the 2nd Reversing and Offensive-oriented Trends Symposium (pp. 2:1--2:10). Vienna, AT: New York, NY, USA: ACM International Conference Proceedings Series (ICPS).
- Bove, D. (2018). Using Honeypots to Detect and Analyze Attack Patterns on Cloud Infrastructures. Unpublished master’s thesis. Friedrich-Alexander University, Erlangen, Germany.